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ABSTRACT
Estimate show that businesses will lose approximately 5% of revenue annually to occupational
fraud. A small business generating $5 million in annual revenue will be estimated to lose
$250,000 annually to fraud. The small business owners, with only a few employees, do not have
the luxury an internal audit department to keep fraud in check. The small business owners must
rely on themselves to be the audit department and it has to happen in a cost effective manner. In
order to combat the possibility of fraud, the small business owner must first be familiar with the
concepts of the fraud models. The fraud triangle theory states that three elements, pressure,
opportunity, and rationalization, must be present for fraud to occur. The small business owner
can deter fraud by eliminating one of the elements. Opportunity can be weakened with the
segregation of certain duties, requiring mandatory vacations, monthly account reconciliations
and analysis. Capability, must be considered when evaluating how fraud could occur. Open
communication and education of fraud awareness is also a vital tool in deterring fraud.
Employees should be made aware that management is conscious of the possibility of
occupational fraud and that such actions will not be tolerated. The small business owner does
not need to spend a lot of money on fraud deterrence measures. Establishing firm policies,
communicating with employees and creating internal controls are all cost effective deterrents to
combat the opportunity and capability of occupational fraud.
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Small businesses are unique because of their size. This enables them to adapt to customer
requests, respond quickly to their competition and provide gainful employment. According to
the United States Census Bureau Survey, small businesses (with less than 500 employees)
provided employment for 59.8 million people and generated payrolls in excess of 2.2 billion
dollars (see Table1). Firms employing 500 people or more provided employment for 60.7
million people and generated payrolls in excess of 2.8 billion dollars. Non-employer firms
defined in this chart are businesses with no employees or payroll such as solo practitioners.
Table 1

U.S. Census Bureau Survey 2007
U.S. Census Bureau
Survey 2007
All firms

Non-employer firms
Firms with 1 to 499 employees

Firms and
Establishments

Paid
Employees

Annual Payroll

Sales or
Receipts

57,170,715

120,604,265

5,026,778,232

30,738,533,467

21,708,021

n/a

n/a

991,791,563

12,577,567

59,866,924

2,204,837,721

11,380,080,684

Firms with 500 employees or
more
1,177,106
60,737,341
2,821,940,511
Table1 Note: Data is combined for ease of reading. The full chart can be found in Appendix A

18,366,661,220

Although the data indicates that small businesses can compete with larger firms, it is also the
small business’ size that is one of the biggest downfalls. Small businesses are more susceptible
to occupational fraud.

According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”)

2010 Report to the Nations, small businesses are disproportionately victimized by occupational
fraud because small organizations are typically lacking in anti-fraud controls compared to their
larger counterparts. (Ratley, 2012) Some of their weaknesses against fraud are the lack of
available resources or the lack of the basic understanding of the fraud models. Another
weakness is the simple attitude that fraud could never occur at their business. Increasing the
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small business owner’s education and awareness of the two predominant fraud models,
specifically the opportunity side of the fraud triangle and the capability side of the fraud
diamond, will enable him/her to deter fraud without adding additional resources. Establishing
firm policies, communicating with employees and developing consistent internal controls are
cost effective deterrents for the small business owner to combat the opportunity and capability of
occupational fraud.
The Reason Small Businesses Are Susceptible To Fraud.
In the article “Fraud Awareness in Small Business” published in The National Public
Accountant, C. Lavery, D. Lindberg, and K. Razaki stated there are three reasons small
businesses are considered to be the most vulnerable to fraud. First, the very size of a small
business limits its ability to segregate duties or functions related to authorizing, record keeping
and physically safeguarding assets. The opportunity to commit fraud is increased when internal
controls are weakened by the lack of segregation. Second, smaller businesses often overlook the
importance of routine accounting functions such as account reconciliations and specific account
analyses. Third, the management and employees of the company may not have adequate fraud
awareness.

It is also very common for the management of smaller businesses to believe that the

close relationships that exist among the employees will prevent fraud from being committed.
These feelings of trust may in fact create the environment of opportunity to commit fraud.
There is no state or federal legislation that requires a privately held small business to
combat fraud. The anti-fraud legislations only apply to publically traded companies. A small
business may be required by a commercial lender to produce audited financial statements as part
of their loan agreement. If a small business is required to produce such statements, an
independent certified public accountant would be required to conduct an audit of the statements
in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards and specifically Statement on
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Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud (“SAS 99”). SAS 99 is an auditing
statement issued by the Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and became effective for audits of financial statements produced after December
15, 2002. (AICPA, 2002) SAS 99 requires auditors to consider fraud and identify risks of
material misstatement due to fraud. SAS 99 does not require a full fraud audit of the business; it
is a guideline for auditors when rendering an opinion on the factual accuracy of the financial
statements. In the process of conducting such an audit occupational fraud may be discovered;
however if a small business is not required by a lender to produce audited financial statements,
the burden of combating fraud falls to the small business only.
Cost of Fraud to the small business owner
The ACFE has produced a biennial survey since 2002 entitled “Report to the Nations on
Occupational Fraud and Abuse” that is based on actual cases reported by Certified Fraud
Examiners (“CFE”) throughout the world. The 2012 report reflects data from 1,388
occupational fraud cases that were reported by the CFE’s that investigated them. The 2010
report reflects data from 1,843 cases. Participants of the survey estimate that the typical
organization will lose 5% of revenue to fraud each year. Applied to the 2011 Gross World
Product, 5% loss translates to potential annual fraud loss of $3.5 trillion. (Ratley, 2012) The
median loss caused by fraud in the 2012 survey was $140,000 and the fraud lasted approximately
18 months before detection.
The ACFE research indicates that occupational fraud falls into three categories:
1. Asset misappropriation schemes: An employee steals or misuses the company
resources (e.g. theft of cash, false billing schemes or inflated expense reports.)
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2. Corruption schemes in which an employee misuses his/her position within a
business transaction in order to gain a direct or indirect personal benefit (e.g.
bribery or conflicts of interest.)
3. Financial statement fraud: An employee intentionally causes a misstatement or
omission of material information in the business financial reports (e.g. recording
fictitious revenue, understating expenses, inflating assets.)
The chart below reflects data from the ACFE reports issued in 2012, 2010 and 2008. In the last
three years the survey was conducted, asset misappropriation was the most prevalent fraud
detected and is the easiest to commit against a small business.
Table 2

Occupational Fraud by Category - Frequency
88.7%
86.3%
86.7%

Asset Missapproriation

26.9%
32.8%
33.4%

Corruption

2008
2010
2012

10.3%
4.8%
7.6%

Financial Statement Fraud

0%

20%

40%
60%
Percent of Cases

80%

100%
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The ACFE survey revealed that occupational fraud is a significant threat to small businesses. The
smaller businesses within the study suffered the largest losses because they employ fewer antifraud controls which increase the opportunity for fraud to occur.

Comparing data from the

2012 and 2010 surveys, lack of internal controls represents the largest weakness observed by
CFE’s in fraud cases followed by overriding internal controls and lack of management review.
Table 2

Primary Internal Control Weakness Observed by
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE)
35.5%
38.8%

Axis Most Importanct Contributing Factor

Lack of Internal Controls
19.4%
19.2%
18.7%
17.9%

Override of Internal Controls
Lack of Management Review
9.1%
8.4%
7.3%
6.9%

Poor Tone at the Top
Lack of Competent Personnel in Oversight Roles

3.3%
5.6%
2.5%
1.9%
2.2%

Lack of Independent Check/Audits
Lack of Employee Fraud Education
Other*

2010

1.8%
1.8%
0.3%
0.6%

Lack of Clear Line of Authority
Lack of Reporting Mechanisim

*Other category not included in 2010 Report

2012

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Percent of Cases

The detection of occupational fraud cases is often a critical moment for the small
business. Decisions must be made quickly to mitigate losses and a thorough investigation must
be completed. The method of detection can open or close several options for a business. The
outcome may vary substantially if management learns of an alleged fraud from an anonymous
source as opposed to law enforcement. (Ratley, 2012) The ACFE survey results indicate that a
tip is still the most prevalent trend in detecting frauds. Of the cases described in 2012 and 2010,

45%
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reporting a tip of the alleged fraud was highest the detection method at 43.3% and 40.4%
respectively.
Table 3

Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds
43.3%
40.2%

Tip
14.6%
15.4%

Management Review

14.4%
13.9%

Internal Audit
7.0%
8.3%

Detection Method

By Accident

4.8%
6.1%

Account Reconcillation

4.1%
5.2%

Document Examination

2012
2010

3.3%
4.6%

Exteral Audit
Notified by Police

3.0%
1.8%

Monitoring

1.9%
2.6%

Confession

1.5%
1.0%

Other*

1.1%

IT Controls

1.1%
0.8%
0%

10%

20%
30%
Percent of Cases

40%

50%

*Other category not included in 2010 Report

The detection tip percentage is further broken down in the list below. Tips from employees to
management or a person of authority regarding occupational fraud occurring at the business was
at 50% followed by information from a customer at 22.1% and an anonymous tip at 12.4%.
Education of employees on definition of fraud and developing a procedure that will allow
employees to make a report when they notice something will only increase that number.
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Source of Tips
Employee
50.9%
Customer
22.1%
Anonymous
12.4%
Other
11.6%
Vendor
9.0%
Shareholder/Owner
2.3%
Competitor
1.5%
The Fraud Triangle and Fraud Diamond
Before discussing the deterrents to occupational fraud in the small business, knowledge
of why an employee may commit fraud must be understood. The Fraud Triangle and The Fraud
Pyramid are models for explaining factors.
The fraud triangle originated from Donald Cressey’s hypothesis published in "Other
People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement.” Cressey’s theory
discusses persons of trust having a non-sharable financial problem or pressure. This problem
can be secretly resolved by violating the position of trust by using the opportunities available to
them. Finally, the perpetrator adjusts his/her conceptions of himself/herself or rationalizes the
use of the entrusted funds for his/her own use. This hypothesis became known as the Fraud
Triangle.

Image courtesy of Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
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Pressure: The first side of the triangle is represented by need for money, whether actual
or just the desire for it. (Kapp/Heslop, 2011) The pressure serves as the spark to motivate
the potential fraudster to start investigating and weighing the options of occupational fraud.
Opportunity: The second side of the triangle represents the ability to commit fraud with
little or no probability of the potential fraudster getting caught. The opportunity is improved
by weak internal controls or an employee having direct access to liquid assets such as cash,
with little or no oversight. (Kapp/Heslop, 2011)
Rationalization: The third side of the triangle is the potential fraudster’s justification of
the act. (Kapp/Heslop, 2011) Some examples of rationalizations are:
“This is only a loan, I will pay it back”
“I am providing for my family.”
“My employer is underpaying/cheating me.”
“My employer is dishonest to others. They deserve to be fleeced”

Another theory that expands on the fraud triangle is the fraud diamond. The fraud
diamond theory, introduced by David Wolfe and Dana Hermanson, enhanced Cressey’s fraud
triangle by adding another side entitled capability

Image courtesy of The Ohio Society of CPAs
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Wolf and Hermanson, through their experiences in investigating frauds, proposed that not
only do the pressure, need and rationalization need to be present to commit fraud, but capability.
(Wolf and Hermanson, 2004) Capability is someone with a high position/function, high
intelligence, confidence/ego, and good coercion skills. The person must also be a convincing liar
and be immune to the inherent stress brought on by perpetrating a fraud.
1. A person’s position with the company may create the opportunity for fraud not
available to others. The higher the person’s function gives the potential fraudster
more information of the company systems and access to them.
2. The person committing fraud is smart enough to understand and exploit internal
controls and weakness and to use their position and authorized access within the
company to the greatest advantage.
3. The fraudster must have a strong ego and great confidence that he/she will not be
detected or they believe they can talk their way out of the matter if discovered.
4. Successful fraudsters can coerce others to commit or conceal fraud. A strong
personality can convince someone else to go along with the fraud or at a minimum
look the other way and stay quiet.
5. Fraudsters must be effective liars. To avoid detection, they must look auditors,
supervisors and others in the eye and lie convincingly. They must also have the
skills to keep track of the lies so their story remains consistent.
6. Committing and managing fraud is stressful. Risk of detection, the possible personal
ramifications and the need to conceal the fraud on a daily basis are all stress factors
that must be managed by the fraudster.
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Case: TeriLyn Norwood
TeriLyn Norwood was the ideal employee. The office worker, who kept taking on more
responsibilities just because the jobs needed to be done, was becoming more trusted by her
employer. In no time at all she was completely in charge of the human resource and accounts
payable functions for a small truck manufacturing company in Hartford Connecticut. (Wilder,
2005) Unbeknownst to her employer, Norwood’s personal life was in turmoil. She had
recently gone through a divorce and owed back child support in the amount of $20,000. Under
California law, Norwood had to pay the back child support or serve a jail sentence. She
approached her employer inquiring about financial assistance and was denied. The pressure was
mounting. Norwood saw no other way out and embarked on a four month scheme in which she
stole $18,000 from her employer. (Wilder, 2005)
The asset manipulation was quite easy. She just simply placed a label with her name on
company check over the original payee’s name. Prior to her first theft, Norwood evaluated the
probability of her employer discovering her fraud and found it to extremely low. Norwood was
aware that the office manager only balanced the bank account off of the bank statement and
check run produced by the accounting system. The office manager never bothered to look at the
actual cancelled checks. (Wilder, 2005) Norwood saw a weakness in the accounting cycle as
her opportunity to steal. Norwood’s fraud was not discovered through internal controls but rather
by meticulous bank teller. The bank teller simply lifted the label off of the check and revealed
the actual payee of the check. (Norwood, 2003) Norwood was convicted of embezzlement and
sentenced to two years in prison.
A positive pay system instituted at Norwood’s employer would have discovered the fraud
immediately. At a minimum, management should be reviewing the bank statements and the
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actual cancelled checks. Knowing there was a positive pay system in place would have most
likely stopped Norwood from attempting the theft in the first place. The opportunity would not
have been available to her.
After the incident, Norwood’s employer emphasized attempting theft would be met with
serious consequences; the next employee at Norwood’s old position also stole from the company.
As a result, the employer now has outsourced the accounts payable and receivable functions for
the company. (Wilder, 2005)
Case: Amy Wilson
Amy Wilson was the office manager for a small manufacturing firm in Indiana.

Wilson

was described as a hard worker. She came in early and stayed late. Her employer was confident
in leaving the day to day operations of the business in her hands while he enjoyed the fruits of
his labors. Wilson found that her theft was easy because her employer was not interested in
internal controls. The one control in place was that Wilson did not have check signing
privileges.
Wilson’s pressure arrived in the form of legal trouble for one of her children. There was
an altercation with the law and she needed funds to pay an attorney to represent her son in court.
(Wilson, 2013) Since she was in charge of all aspects of accounts payable she simply made a
check out to herself in the accounting system test module and forged an authorized signature.
Wilson vowed to herself that it was only a loan and she would repay the funds as soon as
possible. (Wilson, 2013) Her son’s legal problems were resolved and no one noticed the
missing funds.

Wilson soon found she became addicted to the money. She began to use the

funds for personal items such as to pay her monthly credit card bill and to help friends and
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family that encountered financial hardships. In Wilson’s own words, she became “An
overachiever and people pleaser, I thrived on their appreciation of ‘my generosity’ and on my
status as their savior.” (Wilson, 2013)
Wilson hid her fraud in a cost of goods account for her employer’s largest customer.
When the CPA firms noticed the increase in the account activity over the previous year, they
suggested doing a more detailed analysis. The employer rebuked the suggestion stating it was a
waste of money. (Wilson, 2013)

It was not her employer, internal controls or the outside CPA

firm that discovered Wilson’s theft; it was her own credit card’s fraud department. They had
noticed that the payments were being made with a company check and contacted the employer.
Wilson embezzled over $345,000 from her employer over a four year period and pled guilty to
eight counts of forgery and theft and was sentenced to six years in prison.
In both the Norwood and Wilson cases, the small business owners failed to recognize
opportunities for fraud within their systems or the capabilities of employees working for them.
Norwood’s and Wilson’s employers used trust as an internal control and it failed. Both Norwood
and Wilson served their jail sentences and now have to explain to future employers that they are
convicted felons. Both women also work as motivational speakers for The Pros and The Cons,
an organization that educates businesses on fraud prevention using both industry professionals
and those convicted of fraud crimes. (http://www.theprosandthecons.com/)

Case: U.F.C.W. Local 1776.
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 (“The Local”) employed 75 people in
Pennsylvania, three of whom made up the accounting department, which was responsible for $14
million in revenue each year. The Local utilized a very manual system. Schedules were still
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completed by hand and then analyzed. Information had to be compiled from two or three
different systems to get information needed for simple transactions such as bank account
reconciliation. Over the years some automation of the systems was implemented to improve
efficiency, and with every request made to a supervisor, it was answered with “do whatever
needs to be done.” The only request that was constantly denied was additional help.

The

Controller had autonomy over all matters financial and the complete trust of management and the
governing board.
The Local was required by its financial lender to produce audited financial statements
yearly. Once per year, an independent auditor would verify the financial statements. The Local
used the same auditor for 12 years. Since the Local is not a publically traded company, they
were not required to rotate audit partners as required by Sarbanes Oxley Act (“SOX”). The
auditor’s main job was to verify the accuracy of the statements, not to detect fraud. They did
modify some of their methods after the enactment of SOX and the issuance of SAS 99, including
requesting last minute schedules of accounts not normally analyzed, and asking the accounting
department staff if they were aware of any fraud.
Humans are creatures of habit and that includes auditors. Every year there were specific
accounts that were requested for more detailed analysis during the audit. The high volume
accounts that were the heart of the financial statements were always in the review. Smaller
accounts that had a significant difference, approximately 5%, in the account balance from the
previous year would require specific information or at least an explanation to the auditors. If an
account had a percentage difference under 5% from the previous year, the auditors would not
question it. Those accounts were the best place to conduct any fraud.
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The Controller instituted certain internal control policies to protect the Local from
possible fraud.
1. A request was made to utilize another person from a different department to
check in the cash receipts and make deposits. The work did not require a full
time person and it added another layer of separation for the accounting staff.
2. A policy was written that all nonrecurring payables over $500.00 have approval
of a department head and an executive committee member. Normal and
reoccurring payables such as the electric and phone bills were only reviewed by
the Controller but the invoice presented from a local auto repair shop required
two signatures on it before the invoice would be released for payment.
3. All charges to the corporate credit card also had to have two signatures of a
department head and an executive committee member before it would be
processed.
4. Only two members of the accounting staff could enter a new vendor in the
system.

If the Controller was unavailable to do it, a report could be generated

for review by management.
The Controller reported no incidents of occupational fraud within the accounting
department.
Case: Intercool, Inc.,
Intercool, Inc. located in Carrollton, Texas, does approximately 7 million dollars a year in
construction and leasing sales with 12 full time employees. At Intercool, the Controller is the
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accounting department, including receivables, invoicing, entering and paying accounts payables,
reconciling the bank account and creating the payroll files. At no time was a background or
credit check conducted on the Controller. Trust is the internal control.
In order to deter fraud, Intercool is considering:
1. Segregation of duties. Any segregation of the accounting function would be an
improvement. One person should not be responsible for the entire accounting
cycle; checks and balances are needed.
2. A positive pay system. Intercool management should implement a positive pay
system. The larger financial institutions offer this service at little or no cost to
the customer.
3. Diligence with accounts receivable. Intercool management needs to be more
diligent with accounts receivable in the leasing business. Management is fully
aware of the funds owed in the construction and design side of the business.
They are dealing with much larger invoices and receivables. The leasing side is
vulnerable because the funds arrive in much smaller increments. It would be
easy to divert a few hundred dollars here and there from customers into a bank
account that was not the Company’s.
The Controller and management have discussed the issue of segregation of duties which
is a critical need.

They agree it is an issue and it does not make good business sense to leave

the organization so vulnerable. Future discussions are planned to improve the situation.
Although Intercool has not had any known issues with occupational fraud in the past, there are
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suggestions of a $100,000 embezzlement from about seven years ago that have not been
substantiated.
Trust should not be used as a valid internal control. Both Local 1776 and Intercool both
used trust as an internal control, but this needs to be augmented with practices and procedures to
reduce potential fraud.
Best practices for the Small Business Owner.
Fraud affects small-sized companies because there is often a high level of trust among
management and staff. This raises the confidence of the would-be perpetrators because they do
not believe anyone would ever suspect them of fraud. Familiarity breeds a level of complacency
that results in a higher susceptibility to fraud. Implementing good business practice involves
identifying the critical responsibilities that must be done to keep a business in working order, and
having the discipline to ensure that those tasks are carried out consistently and regularly. A best
practice is just an improvement over existing systems and in this case the best practice is to deter
occupational fraud. Small businesses can implement best practices through policies and
oversight that are an inexpensive way to combat fraud.

Some examples of best practices are:

1. Separate as much of the accounting functions as possible. One person should not
be responsible for an entire accounting cycle. If segregation of duties is not
feasible due to the lack of staffing, then consider job rotations. Job rotations will
limit the opportunity for fraud by having employees cross check others work on a
monthly basis.
2. Implement dual signatures on checks/Positive Pay Systems. Requiring multiple
signatures on payment instruments is in itself a check and balance. Two sets of
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eyes are reviewing every check leaving the business. If dual signatures are not
feasible, a positive pay system will allow the financial institutions to be the
second review. Any discrepancies to the positive pay system must be reported to
someone other than the person in charge of the accounts payable function.
3. Conduct background and credit checks on anyone handling company funds.
Employees with credit problems could be potential problems for the small
business owner. (Johnston/Spencer, 2011)
4. Require mandatory vacations of accounting staff. It is a red flag if the employee
does not want to be away from the office. (Laufer, 2011) Fraudsters need to
control the scheme and must be present to do so. Another employee covering
their desk while the fraudster is away risks detection of the fraud.
5. Restrict the use of company credit to all employees. Make a policy that advance
approval must be obtained prior to using the credit. Request original receipts
from employees and have management review the monthly statements.
6. Management must review key reports on a regular basis. This review should
include potential fraud areas such as new vendors, credit memos, inventory write
off and bad debt reports on a regular basis.
7. Accounts need to be reconciled in a timely fashion. Cash accounts are extremely
susceptible to fraud and should be reviewed consistently for accuracy.
Even in the absence of actual internal controls, the perception that the owner is checking up on
business operations can serve as a deterrent. (Kapp, 2011) Best practices are not just about
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getting your businesses in order, it is about setting up your business for the challenges and
opportunities it will face in the future.
Open communication
The small business owner can use communication to prevent fraud. By discussing it
openly within the entire organization it may give pause to a capable employee who has seen an
opportunity within the system to commit fraud. Some examples of open communication are:
1. Conduct basic fraud awareness training. Gather all the employees and discuss what is
expected and how an employee can report a suspected fraud. (Biery, 2012)
2. Periodically remind employees of fraud awareness. Forward recent news articles of
occupational fraud with the reminder that every employee is responsible for preventing
and detecting fraud. (Biery, 2012)
3. Write a mission statement that is focused on ethics and the intention of a fraud-free work
environment. (Lefebvre, 2012)
Setting a clear and open tone from the top of the business stating that fraud will not be tolerated
is an inexpensive way for the small business to combat fraud. The potential fraudster will see
fewer opportunities if management is openly communicating that they are aware of frauds and
are actively looking to prevent it.
Conclusion
The ACFE survey of fraud examiners estimates that businesses will lose approximately
5% of revenue annually to occupational fraud. A small business creating $5 million in annual
revenue will be estimated to lose $250,000 annually to fraud. Small businesses are found to be

DETERRING FRAUD IN SMALL BUSINESS

21

disproportionately victimized by occupational fraud because they are typically lacking in antifraud controls compared to their larger counterparts. Small businesses do not have the structure
or guidelines of state or federal legislation to assist them in the fight against occupational fraud;
therefore, they must take it upon themselves to deter it prior to it occurring. In order to combat
the possibility of fraud, the small business owner must first be familiar with the concepts of the
fraud models. The fraud triangle theory states that three elements, pressure, opportunity,
rationalization, must be present for fraud to occur.

The small business owner can deter fraud

by eliminating one of the elements. Opportunity can be weakened with the segregation of
certain duties, requiring mandatory vacations, monthly account reconciliations and analysis.
The fraud diamond adds a fourth element, capability, which must be considered when
considering how fraud could occur. The small business owner should explicitly assess the
capabilities of key personnel with background and credit checks. There is also no substitute for
spending some time with a person to gain insight. When and if an employee’s capabilities
present significant risk factors, the small business owner must respond with stronger internal
controls or enhanced audit testing.
Implementing best practices, openly communicating and educating staff on fraud
awareness is also a vital tool in deterring fraud. Staff should be trained on what to look for and
devise a system of how fraud can be reported if it is discovered. Employees should be made
aware that management is conscious of the possibility of occupational fraud and that such actions
will not be tolerated. Opportunity for a potential capable fraudster is further closed when the
employee believe they may get caught.
The small business does not have to tackle the issue of fraud deterrence alone. There are
organizations, for example the ACFE, that offer free information such as the fraud check list
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attached in Appendix B, that can be used as a guideline in setting up fraud deterrence practices.
The small business owner does not need to spend a lot of money on fraud deterrence measures.
Establishing firm policies, communication with employees and consistent internal controls are all
cost effective deterrents to combat the opportunity and capability of occupational fraud.
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